

MORAL SENTIMENTS

Undergraduate Seminar — Spring 2001

W1

[Apr 3] **Introductory meeting: Topics and expectations**

[Apr 5] Introductory lecture: **Classic writings on responsibility and moral sentiments**

W2

[Apr 10] Seminar: **Classic writings on responsibility and moral sentiments**

1. Aristotle (1955/330B.C.), Conditions of responsibility for action. From *The Nicomachean ethics* (Trans. J. A. K. Thomson) (Book 3, ch. 1, ch. 5). London: Penguin.

The classic analysis of the folk psychology of intentionality, free will, and responsibility; probably wrong but an inevitable starting point.

2. Hume, D. (1998/1751). Concerning moral sentiment. Excerpt from *Enquiry concerning the principles of morals* (pp. 83-89). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

In this passage, Hume introduces his analysis of moral judgments as sentiments. This analysis is based on his analysis of causal judgments, which according to Hume are based on associations in the mind (and not necessarily about "real" causal connections between physical bodies). Likewise, moral judgments do not refer to anything "really moral" in the agent judged but to the psychological workings of the mind in the perceivers who forms the judgment. This is a "natural" analysis of morality because it places moral issues in the psychology of the perceivers, amenable to scientific study.

3. Adam Smith, A. (1976/1759). Excerpts from *The theory of moral sentiments*. (Edited by D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976.

Part I, section I (pp. 9-23); Part II, section I (pp. 67-78); Part IV (pp. 179-193).

[Apr 12] Introductory lecture: **Meanings of responsibility**

W3

[Apr 17] Seminar: **Meanings of responsibility**

1. Malle, B. F., Moses, L. J., & Baldwin, D. A. (2001). Intentionality, responsibility, and social context [last section of Introduction: The significance of intentionality]. In B. F. Malle, L. J. Moses, and D. A. Baldwin, *Intentions and intentionality: Foundations of social cognition* (pp. 19-24). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

From an overview article on research on intentionality. Focus on the last section, in which we try to clarify the relation of intentionality and responsibility, while distinguishing several meanings of responsibility.

2. Hamilton, V. L., & Sanders, J. (1992). Human action and responsibility. In V. L. Hamilton & J. Sanders, *Everyday justice: Responsibility and the individual in Japan and the United States* (pp. 12-20). New Haven: Yale University Press.

3. Weiner, B. (1995). The anatomy of responsibility. In B. Weiner, *Judgments of responsibility: A foundation for a theory of social conduct* (pp. 1-24). New York: Guilford.

[Apr 19] Introductory lecture: **Psychological research on responsibility**

W4

[Apr 24] Seminar: **Psychological research on responsibility**

1. Graham, S., Weiner, B., Giuliano, T., & Williams, E. (1993). An attributional analysis of reactions to Magic Johnson. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 23, 996-1010.

2. Fincham, F. D, Beach, S. R, & Nelson, G. (1987). Attribution processes in distressed and nondistressed couples: III. Causal and responsibility attributions for spouse behavior. *Cognitive Therapy and Research*, 11, 71-86.

Examined causal and responsibility attributions for spouse behavior in 40 couples seeking therapy and in 40 age- and socioeconomic status (SES)-matched nondistressed community couples. Ss rated the causes of positive and negative partner behaviors, made attributions of responsibility for the behaviors, indicated their affective impact, and specified what they would do in response to each behavior. Distressed spouses saw the causes of negative partner behavior as more global and considered the behavior to be more negative in intent, selfishly motivated, and blameworthy than did nondistressed spouses. The inverse pattern of results was obtained for positive spouse behavior. Only responsibility attributions predicted the affective impact and intended responses to the behavior.

3. Lussier, Y., Sabourin, S. & Wright, J. (1993). On causality, responsibility, and blame in marriage: Validity of the entailment model. *Journal of Family Psychology*, 7, 322-332.

[Apr 26] Introductory lecture: **Interpersonal moral sentiments (anger, blame, and praise)**

W5

[May 1] Seminar: **Interpersonal moral sentiments (anger, blame, and praise)**

1. Tedeschi, J. T., & Felson, R. B. (1994). Perceived injustice and the expression of grievances. In J. T., Tedeschi and R. B. Felson, *Violence, aggression, and coercive actions* (ch. 8, pp. 213-248). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

2. Rozin, P., Lowery, L., Imada, S, & Haidt, J. (1999). The CAD triad hypothesis: A mapping between three moral emotions (contempt, anger, disgust) and three moral codes (community, autonomy, divinity). *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 76, 574-586.

3. Delin, C. R., & Baumeister, R. F. (1994). Praise: More than just social reinforcement. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 24, 219-241.

[May 3] Introductory lecture: **Retribution, revenge, and punishment**

W6

[May 8] Seminar: **Retribution, revenge, and punishment**

Sarat, A. (1999). Remorse, responsibility, and criminal punishment: An analysis of popular culture. In S. A. Bandes (Ed.), *The passions of law* (pp. 168-190). New York: New York University Press.

Gault, B. A., Sabini, J. (2000). The roles of empathy, anger, and gender in predicting attitudes toward punitive, reparative, and preventative public policies. *Cognition and Emotion*, 14, 495-520.

[May 10] Introductory lecture: **Intrapersonal moral sentiments (shame and guilt)**

W7

[May 15] Seminar: **Intrapersonal moral sentiments (shame and guilt)**

1. Williams, B. (1993). Mechanisms of shame and guilt. In B. Williams, *Shame and necessity* (pp. 219-223). Berkeley: University of California Press.

2. Baumeister, R. F, Stillwell, A. M, & Heatherton, T. F. (1994). Interpersonal aspects of guilt: Evidence from narrative studies. In J. P. Tangney & K. W. Fischer (Eds.), *Self-conscious emotions: The psychology of shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride* (pp. 255-273). New York : Guilford Press.

Optional: Keltner, D., & Buswell, B. N. (1996). Evidence for the distinctness of embarrassment, shame, and guilt: A study of recalled antecedents and facial expressions of emotion. *Cognition and Emotion*, 10, 155-171.

Examined whether the antecedents and facial expressions of embarrassment, shame, and guilt are distinct. In Study 1, 51 undergraduates wrote down events that had caused them to feel embarrassment, shame, and guilt. Coding of these events revealed that embarrassment was associated with transgressions of conventions that govern public interactions, shame with the failure to meet important personal standards, and guilt with actions that harm others or violate duties. Study 2 determined whether these 3 emotions are distinct in another domain of emotion, namely, facial expression. 263 introductory psychology students were presented with slides of 14 different facial expressions, including those of embarrassment, shame, and candidates of guilt (self-contempt, sympathy, and pain). Observers accurately identified the expressions of embarrassment and shame, but did not reliably label any expression as guilt.

[May 17] Introductory lecture: **Perspective-taking and empathy**

W8

[May 22] Seminar: **Perspective-taking and empathy**

1a. Mendoza, R. J. (1996). Introduction to the topic of empathy. Unpublished manuscript, Stanford University.

1b. Mendoza, R. J. (1996). Excerpts from "*Emotional*" and "*situational*" inductions of empathy: *Effects on interpersonal understanding and punitiveness*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, Stanford, California.

2. Richardson, D., Hammock, G., Smith, S., & Gardner, W. (1994). Empathy as a cognitive inhibitor of interpersonal aggression. *Aggressive Behavior*, 20, 275-289.

3. Dickey, W. J. (1998). Forgiveness and crime: The possibilities of restorative justice. In R. D. Enright & J. North (Eds.), *Exploring forgiveness* (pp. 106-120). Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

[May 24] Introductory lecture: **Evolutionary origins of moral sentiments**

W9

[May 29] Seminar: **Evolutionary origins of moral sentiments**

1. Povinelli, D.J. & Godfrey, L.R. (1993). The chimpanzee's mind: How noble in reason? How absent of ethics? In M. H. Nitecki & D. V. Nitecki (Eds.), *Evolutionary Ethics* (pp. 277-324). Albany, New York: SUNY Press.

2. Irons, W. (1996). Morality as an evolved adaptation. In J. P. Hurd (Ed.), *Investigating the biological foundations of human morality: An interdisciplinary perspective* (pp. 1-34). New York: Edwin Mellen.

[May 31] **Integrative Discussion: Functions and consequences of moral sentiments**

W10

[June 5] **Concluding meeting: Presentations**